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Economists and the 2002 Farm
Bill: What Is the Value-Added
of Policy Analysis?
Bruce Gardner
The 2002 Farm Act is used as a case study of three problematic considerations related to economists’
role in policy issues: priority on economic efficiency versus income distribution, the role of benefit-
cost analysis, and appropriate policies given market power of agribusiness. The results of the 2002 Act
relevant to each of these issues have been widely criticized, raising questions about the effectiveness
of economists’ involvement. However, given the uncertainties about many key program effects, criti-
cisms of the Act are themselves in question. In this context, the role of economists is seen analytically
as generating information for Bayesian decision makers, and practically as gaining attention for that
information in the political process.
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002—the Farm Bill—is popular politically. It
passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of
280 to 141, and in the Senate by 64 to 35, and was
signed by President Bush in May 2002 without a
discouraging word. Yet, after passage, the Act has
received little but criticism from economists, the
national media, and commentators of all stripes.
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This situation raises questions that are highly
relevant to the topic of the public-service role of
economists. Are the critics correct? To what extent
did economists influence the Act? How were eco-
nomic issues integrated with the politics of the Act?
I will focus on three topics in the huge set of leg-
islative provisions where the outcome has been
particularly contentious: (1) the level of spending,
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1 Even the humorist Dave Barry blasted the Act in a column not written
entirely as a joke. He concluded by stating that while some readers may be
so angry they would never read his column again, “I don’t care! Thanks to
the Humor Security Act recently passed by Congress, I’ll be getting huge
sums of money from the federal government to continue grinding out these
columns, year after year, even if nobody wants to read them! No, that
would be stupid” (Washington Post Magazine, June 30, 2002).
(2) the allocation of spending between commodity
program payments and conservation/environmental
programs, and (3) restrictions on meatpacker owner-
ship of livestock. After addressing these issues, the
paper turns to a discussion of how economists’ con-
tributions may be evaluated.
Issues in the Farm Act
Level of Spending
The main budget news about the 2002 Act is the pro-
jection that new provisions of the Act will cost $80
billion over the 10 fiscal years 2002S2011 (Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2002). Of this amount, $45
billion are for fixed direct payments and the new
“countercyclical payments” (basically a reinstitution
of pre-1996 deficiency payments but without set-
aside requirements). These amounts are in addition
to the direct payments of about $4 billion per year
which were already in the baseline budget.
2 The
result is total commodity program spending of about
$20 billion per year over the next five years. This is
a lot, but as figure 1 shows, it is about $4 billion per
2  Placing those payments in the current policy baseline for years
beyond 2002 was itself controversial because the 1996 Act authorized
them only through 2002.
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Source: Author’s calculations from Congressional Budget Office and House Agriculture Committee data.
                           Figure 1.  Commodity program outlay projections
year less than the federal government has been
spending over the last three years. The reason for the
decline is that the market loss assistance and disaster
assistance outlays of those years, which ran to $8.5
billion per year, are not in the baseline and are not
completely replaced by the new countercyclical pay-
ments.
So the new 2002 farm bill is not quite the unprec-
edented bonanza for farmers it has been portrayed
as being. But it is shockingly high-cost compared to
the $10 to $12 billion average annual cost of 1988S
1997, or the baseline for 2002S2005 which was on
the books before the 2002 bill was enacted (shown
in figure 1). Economists have good arguments to
show the gains from these payments accrue almost
entirely to landowners. Moreover, from the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) data (and from
the Farm Subsidy database on the Environmental
Working Group’s website), we know that the pay-
ments go predominantly to wealthy people with
large farms and, despite payment limitations, a lot
of these payments are well into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually.
Commodity Payments vs. Conservation Programs
Proposals were on the table, primarily in the Senate,
which would have moved substantial sums of money
away from direct payments and toward conservation,
risk management, and rural development programs.
These proposals were defeated, but in the final com-
promise there are substantial additions to conserva-
tion programs. The Conservation Title (Title II) is
scored by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
at a cost of $14 billion over the next 10 years. But
only about a third of these funds are authorized for
the first five years (FY2002S2006), and next year
(2003) the funding is $500 million—not much con-
sidering the numerous provisions and ambitious
descriptions of what these programs are to achieve
in the areas of cleaner water, less soil loss, farmland
preservation, wildlife habitat, and other goals. And,
unlike the commodity programs, the conservation
programs require an annual appropriation of funds;
just being authorized in the farm bill does not get
them off the ground.
Packer Ownership Ban
The Senate farm bill amended the Packers and
Stockyards Act to ban ownership or control of live-
stock by a packer prior to 14 days before slaughter.
This amendment would have stopped production
contracts, such as pervade the broiler industry, from
use in cattle and hogs (and they are already widely
used in hogs, of course). The House bill contained
no such provision, however, and the Senate provision
was dropped from the bill as enacted.Gardner Economists and the 2002 Farm Bill   141
The Role of Economists
The preceding three areas of focus from the 2002
Act are singled out because they provide examples
of the most problematic aspects of economists’ in-
volvement in policy issues.
P The first consideration is the extent to which
economic efficiency should be our guide and,
as a corollary, what we should say on issues of
income distribution.
P The second consideration is related to effi-
ciency, but more specifically the role of full
social-cost accounting, as an element in benefit-
cost analysis—the idea being that public goods
and externalities are topics on which we have
special responsibilities to come to grips with
market failures (and the limitations of what
government can do to correct them).
P The third consideration is the more specific
issue of agribusiness market power, and in
particular what governmental remedies are
appropriate in regulating businesses that deal
with farmers.
On the questions of budget spending and benefit-
cost analysis, the outcomes were arguably counter
to what economists, or at least most mainstream econ-
omists, recommended. With respect to the spending
level, Joseph Stiglitz, former chair of President
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, voiced
what many were thinking when he stated, “[The
Act] is the worst form of political hypocrisy.... we
have been going around the world telling countries
that subsidies distort and lead to unfair competition.
We’ve lost all credibility all over the world” (quoted
in New York Times Magazine, June 9, 2002, p. 25).
Although heavily veiled and stated in low-key
prose, analyses from the USDA’s Economic Re-
search Service (ERS), and more broadly from the
Council on Food, Agricultural, and Resource
Economics (C-FARE, the most politically involved
arm of the American Agricultural Economics Asso-
ciation), lead in the opposite direction of the Farm
Act’s concentration on commodity-based subsidies.
The analyses do this by focusing on the multiple
objectives farm policy must serve, the generally
high level of average farm household incomes and
wealth, the increasing divergence between commod-
ity returns and farm household incomes (because of
off-farm incomes), and the tremendous diversity of
types of farms (see, for example, C-FARE, 2001).
More explicit but still quite general advice along
these lines was provided by USDA; note especially
the endorsement of switching more spending toward
conservation programs, in “Designing a Market-
Based Stewardship Program” (USDA, 2001, p. 86).
While some movement in this direction was embod-
ied in the Senate’s farm bill, the more traditional
House bill prevailed.
Notwithstanding criticisms of the spending level,
counter-arguments more favorable to economists’
concerns can be made about the 2002 Act’s provi-
sions. Consider the following: The direct payment
spending, though large, is essentially a set of lump-
sum payments that farmers cannot change through
their decisions about what to produce, how much
to produce, or the production practices followed.
3
Therefore, few if any deadweight losses due to mar-
ket distortions will occur, and the policies in fact
are quite efficient.
This need not have been the case. The bill could
have brought back set-asides along with target prices,
or reestablished export subsidies or Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) purchase and storage pro-
grams. But Congress eschewed these possibilities,
and indeed replaced market-distorting programs with
payment programs in peanuts and dairy (replacing
a supply control program and the Northeast Dairy
Compact, respectively). Therefore, the counter-argu-
ment runs, what we have is in fact a considerable
economic success!
What does this counter-argument miss? One big
omission is the deadweight losses associated with
raising the taxes which will sooner or later have to
be levied to pay the $4.5 billion annual additional
payments. With a marginal cost of raising funds of
10 to 25 cents per dollar raised (see Alston and
James, 2002), the deadweight loss on this score
could well be $1 billion annually.
A second issue is the updating of acreage and
yield bases for payments to 1998S2001 averages, if
the farmer chooses, which blunts the point that the
payments do not influence production decisions.
Now farmers will have an incentive to maintain pro-
duction in order to be in a favorable position for
future updating.
A third issue is a set of individually small but
collectively significant changes: (a) the market-dis-
torting sugar support price is effectively increased,
(b) the new Dairy Market Loss Program makes
3  The bulk of these payments (the countercyclical payments) are not
decoupled from market conditions since they fall as market prices rise,
once the loan level is reached. So they will not be counted as decoupled for
World Trade Organization (WTO) purposes. But they are decoupled from
farmers’ input- and output-level decisions, and thus are lump-sum in that
(highly relevant) sense.142   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
payments on a current production base, (c) part of
the new peanut support system is a marketing loan
program that makes payments on a current produc-
tion base, and (d) similar marketing loan programs
are introduced for wool, mohair, honey, and pulses
(chickpeas, lentils, and dry beans). These are signif-
icant new market-distorting (production-inducing)
subsidy programs.
A fourth issue involves international repercussions:
foreign countries and international organizations
have almost uniformly castigated the farm bill as
trade-distorting, revealing the U.S. line on interna-
tional agricultural trade liberalization as a paradigm
of hypocrisy. However, for reasons given above, it
is not so clear that the farm bill is a quantum leap in
distortionary policy. And with respect to trade poli-
cy, the farm bill avoids the obvious pitfall—the risk
of violating our WTO commitment to cap “amber
box” spending at $19.1 billion—by a provision that
the Secretary “shall, to the maximum extent practi-
cable,” adjust the expenditures on payments to assure
no violation will occur.
Can we go beyond efficiency to say that transfer-
ring hundreds of millions of dollars in payments
from rank-and-file taxpayers to millionaires each
year for the next 10 years is, in and of itself, waste-
ful (beyond the deadweight losses)? I may say so as
a concerned citizen, as an egalitarian, or as a liber-
tarian who doesn’t like the government taking money
out of one set of pockets and putting it into another
as a general proposition; but for an economist trying
to be objective, the case is not so clear.
With respect to spending on conservation/envi-
ronment versus lump-sum direct payments, the issue
here is one of costs and benefits. Consider a pro-
gram costing $1 billion. Are the social plus private
benefits generated by spending a billion dollars on
conservation programs greater than the private ben-
efits of a billion dollars to farmers or landowners
through commodity program payments?
What makes the comparison difficult for the
conservation programs is that the farmer’s conser-
vation payments are largely used up in the costs of
the conservation practices funded. The net farmer
benefits are the surplus payments received by
farmers over and above the costs of the practices.
To those benefits we must add the social benefits of
cleaner water, scenic views, wildlife value, and
other gains. How big is the sum? How can we be
confident the total benefits will justify the costs?
The few estimates attempted suggest the Conser-
vation Reserve Program has generated benefits that
exceed the costs. Yet this is not an indisputable
finding, because so often the environmental benefits
are hard to measure.
Suppose the new Conservation Security Program
costs $100 million for payments to farmers, who
have to use the funds for practices that cost them
$70 million, in return for which farmers get $10
million in private benefits (soil preserved) and soci-
ety gets social (nonmarket) benefits of $40 million.
The overall net return on the $100 million of tax-
payer cost is ($100!$70 + $10 + $40 =) $80 million.
The other option is just to give $100 million to
farmers, requiring them to do nothing in return. The
net overall social (private plus public) return on the
$100 million spent is $100 million.
This is just an example, of course, but it illustrates
that the costs of conserving production practices are
a real hurdle conservation programs must surmount,
suggesting the decision Congress made to spend
more on direct payments and less on new conser-
vation programs than in the main alternative was
not necessarily the egregiously bad decision some
commentary has portrayed it to be.
With respect to packers and contracting, the situa-
tion is different. From beginning to end of the debate,
economists were on both sides of the issue. Indeed,
economists made stronger public statements during
the Congressional deliberations than on either of the
bigger-money issues already discussed. The Farm
Bill title developed out of legislation proposed by
Senator Harkin (D-Iowa), Chair of the Senate Agri-
culture Committee, strengthening a call from several
Midwestern state officials for a Producer Protection
Act that would give growers several forms of protec-
tion against being exploited economically under
production contracts, and ban paying producers
according to how they performed as compared to
other producers. The Senate bill added to such pro-
tections a ban on packer ownership or control before
14 days in advance of slaughter. The Conference
Committee dropped the ban on ownership or control,
and restricted to swine production the Senate bill’s
stipulation that contracting growers can discuss the
terms of their contract with advisors or relevant
government agencies, notwithstanding any confi-
dentiality clause the contract may contain.
Some agricultural economists cautioned against
the Producer Protection Act, notably Feuz et al.
(2002) and Boehlje et al. (2001).
4 But they did not
have strong empirically based arguments to support
4  See also the related story, “Contract Farming Legislation Wrong-
Headed: Purdue Report Warns that Well-Intentioned Lawmakers May
Harm Family Farming,” Progressive Farmer (June 2001), available online
at www.progressivefarmer.com/issue/0501/contract/default.asp.Gardner Economists and the 2002 Farm Bill   143
the idea of harm to producers from such legislation.
In an especially vigorously argued contribution,
Conner et al. (2002) rebut objections raised against
the packer ownership ban, and argue more broadly
that oligopsony power of packers is harming farmers.
Where their argument is weak, however, is its lack
of an analytical or factual basis for expecting a ban
on packer ownership to reduce oligopsony power
and thereby improve the economic situation of live-
stock producers.
The above issue was addressed by the USDA’s
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Admin-
istration (USDA/GIPSA, 1997) in its comments on
a petition for rulemaking which would have accomp-
lished essentially the same end (banning packer
ownership or control) through USDA’s regulatory
authorities under the Packers and Stockyards Act.
GIPSA quotes four economists from Land-Grant
Universities, all of whom express disbelief that
restraining packers from ownership or control
would increase farm-level product prices. Despite
the fact that 1,651 of 1,757 comments favored the
petition, USDA concluded that “promulgating the
rules suggested by the petition is unwarranted”
(USDA/GIPSA, 1997). The petitioners’ lack of
success through the USDA precipitated the legis-
lative efforts of 2001S02, which also ultimately
failed.
During the 2002 legislative debate there was little
public discussion, in hearings or other governmental
forums, on the anti-packer provision. But the tenor
of the earlier regulatory discussion gives strong
signals to indicate USDA economists (both within
GIPSA and ERS) would have been advising against
the efficacy of this title, notwithstanding general
concern among agricultural economists about pro-
ducers’ risks of being exploited under contracts with
imperfectly competitive buyers.
5
One could point to the outcome of the rule-
making petition, and perhaps of the farm bill title,
as a victory of economists’ arguments over reason-
ably strong political pressure toward an opposite
conclusion. But actually the economists’ arguments
are not very strongly stated. They don’t say that cap-
tive supplies and packer concentration are known to
be harmless to producers, but rather that the evi-
dence is inconclusive. The more fundamental issues
exemplified by the debate are quite general ones:
How suspicious should we be of agribusiness? And
what should government do to regulate such busi-
nesses to reduce their market power?
6 I am not
going to try to resolve these issues, but instead to
use this debate as an illustration of a more general
context for considering how to place a value on pol-
icy research.
Valuation of Policy Research
In carrying out policy research, the goal is to pro-
vide a service to society. The key to evaluating this
service is to recognize that the good being produced
is information. The value of policy research is the
increase in the value of public goods produced as a
result of this information being available. So, to
have any value, the research must somehow affect
public (i.e., governmental) decisions.
Recognition of this situation sets us up to use the
well-established theory of the value of information
in decision making, most helpfully developed in the
context of Bayesian decision makers (see Hirsh-
leifer and Riley, 1992, chapter 5). The Bayesian
approach takes seriously the idea that policy makers
are uncertain about the consequences of policy
alternatives, and also that research findings reported
to policy makers may be incorrect. The value of pol-
icy research then depends upon: (1) the value of the
policy change induced by the research findings, if
they are correct; (2) policy makers’ prior knowledge
of the issue; and (3) the accuracy of the researchers’
findings. To observe how these factors interact,
consider a simplified example of the issue of packer
regulation (illustrated by figure 2).
Let there be two possible states of the world: S1,
where packers are exploiting farmers through their
ownership/control of livestock under production
contracts with growers; and S2, where competition
is sufficient such that the contracts are mutually
beneficial to growers and packers. The world is in
one of these two states, but policy makers don't
know which. Policy research provides an estimate
of which state prevails.
5  The Bush Administration took no official position for or against the
packer ownership ban in 2002, continuing the noncommittal stance the
Clinton Administration had taken in the earlier petition for rulemaking.
There is some partisan distinction though, because in the Conference Com-
mittee on the 2002 farm bill, the Senate’s four Democratic conferees sup-
ported the title while the three Republicans opposed it [although Senator
Grassley (R-Iowa) was a strong supporter in the Agriculture Committee],
with the House conferees not participating in voting on the measure.
6  To lay my own prejudices on the table, I am suspicious of the market
power of agribusiness, but I am also suspicious of policies to regulate
them, and I don’t believe regulatory remedies should be legislated without
a clear prospect that feasible regulation will generate social benefits which
exceed the costs. In the case of the packer ownership ban, some farmers
find production contracting attractive, so why not let them do it? In Mary-
land we have a track record on production contracting in broilers, and it is
good. In a recent assessment of Maryland’s agricultural situation and pros-
pects, we found broiler growers among the state’s least unhappy producers





















































































  Figure 2.  Value of findings on competition
Two policy actions are possible: B, ban packer
ownership or control under contracts; and C, let the
contracts proceed. The social value of the resulting
outcome is V(i, j), where i is the state of the world
and j is the policy chosen. V is measured by a weight-
ed sum of producer (both farmers and packers) and
consumer-taxpayer benefits. There are four possible
outcomes, shown as points B1, B2, C1, and C2 in
figure 2. If policy B is chosen, the result is point B1
if packers are oligopolistic exploiters, but B2 if com-
petition rules and farmers are denied a beneficial
marketing option under the ban. If policy C is
chosen, the result is C1 if packers are oligopolistic
exploiters, but C2 if competition rules. We will
regret choosing B if competition rules, and C if pack-
ers are oligopolistic exploiters.
The distance along the horizontal axis of figure 2
measures subjective probability, B2 (increasing left
to right from 0 to 1), of packers being competitive
(and this implies the value of B1, since B1 + B2 = 1).
Suppose we are maximally uncertain about B1 and
B2, so B1 = B2 = 0.5. To find the policy that maxi-
mizes the expected value of V, we want the highest
level, point H, which is obtained by choosing policy
B. Then maximize the expected value of V(i, j) by
choosing policy B, giving expected V(i, j) at the
level of point M.
Now consider the value of a policy research pro-
gram that provides an estimate of whether packers
are competitive or not. The research program will
deliver an estimate, but it may be incorrect. As an
example, consider the research program undertaken
by GIPSA following enactment of the 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR)
Act. The finding of GIPSA’s research program can
be viewed in these terms as generally favoring
competition, but the probability of that finding
being incorrect was not negligible—leaving room
for arguments of the kind outlined above. Suppose
(this is purely conjectural) the uncertainties are as
given by the following probabilities of research
findings:Gardner Economists and the 2002 Farm Bill   145
Research Finding
True State Competitive Exploitive
Competitive 0.75 0.25
Exploitive 0.25 0.75
If the true state is either exploitation or competition,
the research will correctly obtain this finding with
75% probability, but with 25% probability the
research will produce the incorrect finding. These
likelihoods provide us with an operational measure
of research quality—the higher the quality, the closer
to 1’s on the principal diagonal. Applying Bayes’
Theorem to calculate the posterior probabilities, the
posterior probabilities are 0.75 that each result, if



















Oligopoly  0.5  0.75 0.375 0.375/0.50 = 0.75
Competition  0.5  0.25 0.125 0.125/0.50 = 0.25
0.500
In figure 2, if the finding were of exploitation, we
have B2 = 0.25, and we choose B, with expected
benefits at R. If the finding were of competition, we
have B2 = 0.75, and choose C with expected benefits
at point T, which happens to equal M. The research
finding makes no difference in our choice in the
first case. But the research causes us to reverse
course in the second scenario, with an expected gain
in welfare of M!L over the choice we would have
made in pre-research ignorance.
Before the research is undertaken, the expected
value of V is the mean of B1 and B2, which is plotted
at point H (figure 2). When we undertake the re-
search program, the expected value of our ending
point after the research is completed (under our pro-
vision that each research finding is equally likely)
is G. Thus, the ex ante value of the research is
measured by the vertical distance G!H.
The preceding describes an ideal of influence
upon policy and the value of such influence. In
conclusion, I turn to a key aspect of practice.
Policy Research in the Political Arena
A practical issue is how to get one’s findings noticed.
I take seriously the notion that public service through
economics should influence actual policy, but there
are real issues in how far to go in advocacy. Some
people make a sharp distinction between positive and
normative economics: Should we restrict ourselves
to policy analysis that spells out the consequences
of alternative governmental actions? Or should we
make explicit recommendations?
Whenever I have done the former, and the alter-
native policies under consideration have notably
different consequences, I have usually not been able
to resist saying which alternative I favor. In any
case, taking the “normative leap” to recommenda-
tions typically matters little in practice, because
what cuts the most ice is analytical findings about
the results of choosing one alternative over another,
and that is what the economist gets from positive
analysis.
A related practical issue is getting one’s analysis
and recommendations accepted (as opposed to being
dismissed). Typically, we follow a quite passive
approach: build the correct analytically supported
case, and they will accept it. If they don’t, it’s their
problem. What can an academic or agency-bound
economist do beyond this?
P First, you can take steps to get your positions
and findings noticed, principally publishing in
places outside the academic journals and parti-
cipating in broadly aimed conferences or other
public events.
P Second, you can retail your findings to policy
makers via personal communication with staffs
or office-holders.
P Third, you can step up to defend your views in
public discussion, written and oral, when alter-
natives are being debated.
Personally, I have attempted all these strategies
at various times, and with very mixed success. What
I have had finally to accept is that you never see a
group or person converted before your eyes if they
disagreed before. You find yourself either beating
your head against a wall (where your recommenda-
tion is unwelcome) or knocking on an open door
(when your recommendation is welcome). What
you can hope to accomplish is to plant seeds for
further thought in your audience, which is arguably
all we can or should wish for.
7  The situation would be more complicated if the prior probabilities
were not 0.5 and if the likelihood matrix were not symmetric—e.g., if there
were greater errors in research findings of competition than of oligopoly
(see Gardner, 2002, for details).146   October 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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